Sara's War.

Or, Chairman Mac On Guerrilla Warfare

This little study is being published in honor of Macario ‘Mac’ Peralta Jr, leader of the Panay guerrillas 1942-1945, to remember the occasion of his death on 7 January 1975. Photo shows Mac being decorated with the US Army’s Distinguished Silver Cross.

This essay proceeds from the proposition that in waging a limited war on the Japanese in Panay Island from 1 June 1942 to 18 March 1945, Macario ‘Mac’ Peralta Jr theorized and, along with his warriors and the people of the island, practiced and redefined the science of guerrilla warfare and brought it to an art.

First item in the agenda: Lessons learned. Chairman Mao is considered the Father of Modern Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare (Florian Waitl, 2007 militaryhistoryonline.com), although Che Guevara may be more popular especially among the youth – Che is chic. The term ‘guerrilla warfare’ is modern, originating in the Peninsular War between Spain and France in the early 1800s – ‘guerrilla’ is Spanish for ‘little war’ (history.com). Huntington defines it thus: ‘Guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare by which the strategically weaker side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times, and places’ (S Kalyanaraman, April-June 2003, Strategic Analysis, idsa.in). For a start, I want to define the common concept as simply this: ‘Guerrilla warfare is limited offensive action by compact mobile forces against regular armed forces.’ In fact, guerrilla warfare dates to the 3rd BC when Fabius Maximus used guerrilla warfare against conquering Hannibal during the 2nd Punic War (Waitl as cited). Maximus, the Roman dictator, knew the military superiority of Hannibal, the deadly Carthaginian, so he avoided pitched battles (Wikipedia). Audacity can get you annihilated. ANN (author not named, wildfiregames.com) tells us Maximus won and saved Rome. Guerrilla war works if the guerrillas know at all times what they’re doing.

War? Radical thoughts visited on me today, 29 December 2008, about my beloved country, the Philippines – and I dare say both of them are historical lessons not only for me but for the whole wide world.  One: That 1896, 1899 and 1942 in the Philippines were war years, not revolutionary years. I distinguish. The Katipunan Wars differed with the Panay Guerrilla War in the immediate and direct causes but were similar in their essences, or should have been. Two: That Macario ‘Mac’ Peralta Jr theorized and with his men practiced in Panay Island one of the finest guerrilla warfare witnessed in Asia. In fact, General Douglas MacArthur attested to more than that, in coded radio messages and in plain language.

In August 1896 broke out under the leadership of the brave Andres Bonifacio what is historically referred to as the ‘Katipunan Revolution’ – I say that this is a misnomer. I will presently explain why it really was a war, and that in fact it was guerrilla warfare, and should have been executed as such, which the Panay Guerrilla War was acknowledged to be. In fact, I will show that many so-called revolutions are in fact guerrilla wars. It is important to distinguish between War and Revolution, as your very survival as warrior or revolutionary depends on understanding the nature of your undertaking, not the very least of which you will know where your enemy is coming from, figuratively and literally.

The Katipunan Wars

So, definitions come first. Unless we agree on the premises, we’ll never get anywhere.

My first definition is this: Revolution is a people’s struggle against oppression waged against their own duly constituted authority. Note my emphasis on ‘constituted authority,’ since that’s where the power question lies. Hence, it is proper to say ‘People Power 1’ (aka ‘EDSA Revolution’),  ‘People Power 2,’ ‘French Revolution,’ ‘Bolshevik Revolution.’ Now, was the Katipunan movement against duly constituted authority? If not, it cannot be called the ‘Katipunan Revolution.’ Neither the ‘American Revolution’ against Mother England. ‘Cuban Revolution’ is correct.

My second definition is this: War is a people’s struggle against oppression by unduly constituted authority, waged against invading foreigners. In the case of the Katipunan, the invaders were the Spaniards first and the Americans later. Both usurped the authority vested in the Government of the Philippines, whether it existed formally or not. The Englishmen were invaders in America. Hence, correctly, the ‘American War’ and ‘Katipunan Wars.’ The ‘Philippine Insurrection’ is incorrect.

It is quite important to understand and distinguish: In Revolution, the enemy is US. In War, the enemy is US and THEM.

2 Katipunan Wars. The 1st Katipunan War was against the Spaniards; the 2nd Katipunan War (aka Philippine Insurrection) was against the Americans. They occurred within the same year. In fact, the very moment the Katipunan War against the Spaniards ended – when the Spanish authorities ‘sold’ the Philippines to the highest and only bidder, the United States – was the exact same moment the Katipunan War against the Americans began. The nature of the occupation of the Philippines was the same: colonialism. The Katipuneros’ struggles were the same but the alien species had changed from European to American.

On hindsight, the Katipunan movement was of the nature of guerrilla warfare, or should have been recognized as such, even if the term ‘guerrilla warfare’ had not been invented at that time. Both Katipunan Wars failed because their leaders did not recognize the true nature of those struggles. The Panay movement succeeded because it was guerrilla warfare conducted with finesse. A little study should help explain why the Katipunan Wars were completely heroic and utter failures in achieving independence for the Philippines. The Katipuneros were high on patriotism but low on practical warfare. Or, perhaps, the practice did not match the theory.

Blumentritt’s Blueprint for War

My first surprising source of information out of which I had an insight into wars, and this I had sometime in 1997 yet, is the letter of Austrian professor Ferdinand Blumentritt to his soulmate the Filipino doctor Jose Rizal dated 30 January 1892, where the academician warns the surgeon about taking the Course of Revolution (in The Rizal-Blumentritt Correspondence, 1992, Manila: National Historical Institute, p429-430):

Above all, I beg you not to meddle in revolutionary agitations. Because one who initiates a revolution ought at least to have the probability of success, if he does not wish to burden his conscience with useless bloodshed. …

If today a revolution should break out in the Philippines, it would end in tragedy, for her insular position indeed will make any revolution without a navy a failure. Moreover, the revolutionists will not have munitions to last for more than 5 weeks. Then there are still many pro-friars among the Filipinos. A revolution would not only lead many educated Filipinos to certain death and intensify the oppression of tyranny. A revolution has no probability of success unless: 1st, a part of the Army and Navy rebel; 2nd, the metropolis is at war with another nation; 3rd, there are money and munitions available; and 4th, some foreign country give its official or secret support to the revolution. None of these conditions exists in the Philippines.

For emphasis, let me call the 4 requirements taken together as Blumentritt’s Blueprint for War:

(1) Parts of the Army and Navy rebel.
(2) The metropolis is at war with another country.
(3) There is money and munitions are available.
(4) A foreign country supports the Revolution.

So! Rizal indeed had been thinking Revolution. Thinking, I say. Blumentritt effectively predicted the failure of the Katipunan years before it started 5 years later. By that time, Rizal had stopped thinking.

In his letter, change ‘Revolution’ to ‘War’ and you will see the points raised by Blumentritt. Now then, based on this portion of the letter of Blumentritt, who was a faithful friend of the Filipinos from the beginning to the end of the Propaganda Movement for rightful recognition and fair treatment of dear Filipinas by Mother Spain, the Katipunan Wars did not succeed because they did not follow Blumentritt’s Blueprint for War:

(1) Neither Katipunan War had a Navy to support it. That is why the Spanish and American fleets could arrange for a play battle on Manila Bay. Boys will always be boys and play.

(2) In neither Katipunan War was the Philippines at war with another country to keep Manila busy and distracted and weak. The attention of Spanish authorities was undivided.

(3) There was not enough money to buy enough arms at any time, and hardly anybody was donating. There was no critical mass who believed absolutely in either Katipunan War, whether bourgeoisie or proletariat in origin.

(4) No foreign country gave its tacit or visible support to the struggles. A Revolution is a do-it-yourself thing, but when a country fights a War, it can’t fight it alone. Read the news.

Not following anything similar to Blumentritt’s Blueprint for War, the Katipunan Wars were doomed to failure even before they began. Why didn’t Rizal tell anyone? It was known that Rizal was wont to carry around his voluminous correspondence wherever he moved, but it didn’t seem that anybody else minded anybody’s letter to Rizal, except of course the Spanish authorities who wanted to get rid of him. So, Blumentritt’s blueprint for a successful War (Revolution) was never even heard of before, so the lessons they contained could not have been learned.

Lawrence of Arabia & His 6 Principles of Insurgency

If not from the Katipuneros, perhaps we can learn from one of the most famous guerrilla theorists and practitioners, TE Lawrence (aka Lawrence of Arabia). James J Schneider gives us Lawrence in brief (2005, findarticles.com)

Lawrence distilled six fundamental principles of insurgency that even today have remarkable relevance. First, a successful guerrilla movement must have an unassailable base – a base secure not only from direct physical assault, but from attack in other forms as well, including psychological attack. Second, the guerrilla must have a technologically sophisticated enemy. The greater this sophistication, the greater this alien force would rely on forms of communications and logistics that must necessarily present vulnerabilities to the irregular. Third, the enemy must be sufficiently weak in numbers so as to be unable to occupy the disputed territory in depth with a system of interlocking fortified posts. Fourth, the guerrilla must have at least the passive support of the populace, if not its full involvement. By Lawrence's calculation, ‘Rebellions can be made by 2 percent active in striking force and 98 percent passively sympathetic.’ Fifth, the irregular force must have the fundamental qualities of speed, endurance, presence and logistical independence. Sixth, the irregular must be sufficiently advanced in weaponry to strike at the enemy's logistics and signals vulnerabilities.

3Yes and 3 No is my response. The base is necessary, the sophisticated enemy is not. No, the enemy can never occupy all space. No, the passive support of the populace is dangerous; the active support is absolutely necessary. Yes to ‘speed, endurance, presence and logistical independence.’ Yes, and if your weaponry is not advanced, you can always get some from the enemy.

The Chinese Red War (aka Chinese Red Revolution)

Guerrilla warfare, famous Chinese radical Chairman Mao says (in the treatise Mao Tse Tung On Guerrilla Warfare, 1937, translated from the Chinese, marxists.org), has 7 fundamental steps, and these are: (1) arousing and organizing the people, (2) achieving internal unification politically, (3) establishing bases, (4) equipping forces, (5) recovering national strength, (6) destroying enemy’s national strength, and (7) regaining lost territories. That is based on the Chinese experience in which Chairman Mao played the leading role.

I didn’t find Chairman Mao explaining the 7 steps, so I can’t touch on them. Nonetheless, nothing succeeds like success. If Chairman Mao says those steps are what helped him in driving out the Japanese as well as the nationalists led by Chang Kai Shek, who am I to doubt him? Also, since I cannot reconcile Chairman Mao’s successful guerrilla warfare with Blumentritt’s Blueprint for War, perhaps, ‘To each his own science of guerrilla warfare?’

While Chairman Mao is talking ‘national’ (China) and we’re talking ‘island’ (Panay), I think we can learn quite a few lessons from the Chinese in trying to understand the Panay movement during World War 2, focusing on the (official) years 1942-1945. It was on 1 June 1942 when Chairman Mac assumed command of all USAFFE forces in the island of Panay’ and required all officers and enlisted men ‘to report to the nearest officer for instructions’ (Manikan, 1977, p54).

But since a guerrilla war is dictated first by a claim of conscience and not a chain of command, I rather think it is more correct to date the start of the Panay war of liberation in an undetermined day in late December 1941 when some officers of the USAFFE received from USAFFE Commander Douglas MacArthur some secret instructions: ‘I ordered the commanders in the southern islands to engage in guerrilla warfare’ (p13), the exact language being ‘to establish indefinite loci of resistance in the island (Panay)’ (p31), and that was when Mac Peralta and the others decided to follow those instructions. Their conscience was bothering them.

And why did MacArthur order guerrilla warfare when he knew that the Visayan Islands were ‘admittedly the weakest spot in the Philippine defense’ because of ‘the comparative weakness of the USAFFE’ (in the words of Chairman Mac, p13)? It was precisely because of that: If you cannot make defense, make war.

Cuban rebel Che Guevara himself learned from Chairman Mao, and so did Vietnam rebel Ho Chi Minh, so I would think, although there is no mention of it, that Chairman Mac also learned from Chairman Mao. Since he was brilliant in academic (Araullo High School and UP College of Law) and army terms (topped his PA Infantry School class), and you cannot develop brilliance if you don’t read much, Chairman Mac must have read, read, read, digested, digested, digested.

We learn from Samuel B Griffith, translator of Chairman Mao’s book, that (books.google.com.ph):

Mao advocated unorthodox strategies that converted deficits into advantages: using intelligence provided by the sympathetic peasant population; substituting deception, mobility, and surprise for superior firepower; using retreat as an offensive move; and educating the inhabitants on the ideological basis of the struggle.

That is a good summary of Mao’s war plan; it is Clear, Concise, Coherent. But how about Comprehensive? I mean, you have to think systems.

Sara's War (aka The Panay Resistance)

My other surprising source and major reference on the guerrilla warfare in Panay is the book by Gamaliel L Manikan published in 1977 and entitled Guerilla Warfare On Panay Island In The Philippines (Quezon City: Sixth Military District Veterans Foundation Inc, 756 pages excluding Appendices; from hereon, the content is referred to with a page number, such as p57). It is a study of the guerrilla war waged in Panay during World War 2 under the leadership of whom I call here Chairman Mac – none other than the Ilocano-Pangasinense patriot Macario ‘Mac’ Peralta Jr. And, in comparing, I have found that there are qualitative similarities and there are qualitative differences in the essences and executions of the Katipunan Wars in 1896-1902 and the Panay struggle of 1942-1945. I take it that the science of guerrilla warfare is inexact – which is what science ultimate is, otherwise it becomes the truth and there is no need for science.

A graduate of the University of the Philippines, which is known as a bastion of scholarship and leadership and less of soldiership, I suspect that Mac learned from the genius of published theories & practices of guerrilla warfare before and during Sara's War. I call it Sara's War because it was in Sara, Iloilo, where Chairman Mac established his first headquarters, and in Sara occurred the most dramatic moment of the entire Panay guerrilla struggle, when after months of non-contact with the outside world, radio communication was established for the first time on 20 October 1942 at 2000 hours by Mac’s boys Captain Amos Francia and his Corps Signal team; it was at first a weak signal (p130). How strongly dramatic could a weak signal be? General MacArthur said of it when he returned to Leyte from Australia (Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, 1950, history.army.mil):

Following the disaster which, in the face of overwhelming superior enemy power, overtook our gallant forces, a deep and impenetrable silence engulfed the Philippines. Through that silence no news concerning the fate of the Filipino people reached the outside world until broken by a weak signal from a radio set on the Island of Panay, which was picked up, in the late fall of that same fateful year, by listening posts of the War Department and flashed to my Headquarters. That signal, weak and short as it was, lifted the curtain of silence and uncertainty and disclosed the start of a human drama with few parallels in military history.

He was referring specifically to the highly successful Panay guerrilla warfare waged by gallant men and women led by Macario ‘Mac’ Peralta Jr, my Chairman Mao. MacArthur speaking:

In it I recognized the spontaneous movement of the Filipino people to resist the shackles with which the enemy sought to bind them both physically and spiritually. I saw a people in one of the most tragic hours of human history, bereft of all reason for hope and without material support, endeavoring, despite the stern realities confronting them, to hold aloft the flaming torch of liberty. I gave this movement all spiritual and material support that my limited resources would permit.

‘The news that America had been contacted by radio raised their hopes for ultimate victory’ (p173). It had taken 18 days at Sara from the recruitment of Master Sgt Mariano Tolentino as Radio Officer through the improvisation with the power supply of the radio transmitter to the receipt of a response from KFS (San Francisco, California) on 20 October (p130).

That first contact was a little victory in itself. Victory Joe! Improvisations are thus always welcome.

Unlike others, I refuse to refer to it merely as the ‘Panay Resistance’ because that implies ‘passive resistance,’ which of course the Panay struggle was not; not even ‘active resistance’ adequately describes a guerrilla war. Guerrillas do not merely want to resist the enemy – they want to expel him. Mohandas Gandhi’s campaign was in the nature of resistance; he was precisely avoiding war. Sara's War is patently a declared war. The objective of a guerrilla war is not simply to resist but for the irresistible force to move the immovable object. In form, in  place, in time.

I have read Manikan’s thick book twice and now I can tell you more about the Panay guerrilla war on the Japanese from 1941 to 1945. Chairman Mac and his men (and women) waged that war successfully, but how? Gallantly, if sometimes not fearlessly. Patriotically, if sometimes carelessly. Heroically, if sometimes tragically.

Among the women, special mention must be made of Nati Kasilag Peralta, wife of Mac, who ‘helped immensely in easing up the multifarious details that Lt  Col  Peralta had to attend to as guerrilla chieftain,’ including helping encode to or decode messages from MacArthur in Australia (p60).

The essence of what they did I have already captured in my previous essay on Chairman Mac (‘My Ultimate Guerrilla. Mac Peralta, Brains of the Panay Guerrilla War,’ this blog), but it needs repeating here what our own Senate President and Brigadier General Manuel A Roxas wrote Chairman Mac in a letter dated 4 May 1945, giving his own high estimate of the Panay struggle in these heartwarming words (p734):

That you had been able to build up your force and checkmate the enemy for three long years, and at the same time maintaining the morale of, and protecting the civilian population, is in itself an extraordinary achievement for which the whole nation is grateful to all of you.

And as I said in my earlier essay, inspired by the Roxas message, I came up with these 10 words as perhaps the best summary of guerrilla warfare since Sun Tzu:

Build up your force, checkmate the enemy, protect the people.

My trilogy of guerrilla warfare is: Build, Checkmate, Protect.

The famous Lawrence of Arabia had his own conceptual framework, a trilogy of conceptual hooks for guerrilla warfare: the algebraical, the biological and the psychological, according to James J Schneider (cited). The algebraical factor is subject to calculation, like how many troops are needed to defend an area. The biological factor refers to the wear & tear of the enemy’s readily accessible materiel such as a bridge. The psychological factor refers to the mind of the enemy as well as the people. My criticism is that the concepts are all whats and no hows. These contrast with my trilogy being both theory and practice: build, checkmate, protect.

Chairman Mao has his own trilogy in the waging of guerrilla warfare: time, space, will. He gains time by avoiding battles and giving the enemy space. During that time, he produces will which leads to victory, because those who will admit defeat can be defeated but those who will not admit defeat will produce more will to resist (Waitl, cited). And on to victory, hopefully.

As to my own trilogy, after another and more careful reading of Manikan’s book, Chairman Mac has made me aware of another vital process or step in guerrilla warfare, and that refers to the deadly fact of espionage. Chairman Mac emphasized this to his second-in-command Lt Col Leopoldo R Relunia in his letter of 15 June 1943 (p302):

You were talking about being too busy with certain sectors because they will be the scene of the main effort. … Well, there won’t be any scene of main effort as far as we are concerned unless WE CLEAN UP THIS ESPIONAGE RING. PREVENT ANY FURTHER ESPIONAGE BY GOOD PROPAGANDA ON PEOPLE WHO ARE INCLINED TO BE SPIES AND STRENGTHEN THE MORALE GENERALLY. No one wants to be a spy for the losing side – our job is to convince everyone that the Japs are on the losing side.

Peralta also reminds Relunia about treachery in Philippine history, when civilians slept with the enemy and turned traitor against Emilio Aguinaldo (President of the Philippine Republic) and Diego Silang (Ilocano hero) long before the Katipunan Wars. He tells him that to prevent treachery, you go back to espionage. So now I revise my 10-word Sara’s summary of guerrilla warfare into this that I now call 4 Cardinal Rules of Sara's War:

(1) Build up your force.
(2) Checkmate the enemy.
(3) Protect the people.
(4) Clean up espionage.

13 simple words in 4 pithy phrases completely capture the very soul of making war, making guerrilla war, if you ask me. Clear, Concise, Coherent – and now Comprehensive. Don’t forget the mind of the people; that is where the serpent lies in wait for Eve, or Adam, as the case may be. And remember that the military mind differs from the civilian mind. Comprehensive is how Chairman Mac improved on Chairman Mao of China, not to mention other guerrilla brains such as Lawrence of Arabia, Che Guevara of Cuba, and the ancient Sun Tzu.

If you look at my Venn diagram, my 4 Cardinal Rules of Sara's War cannot be considered steps as they occur simultaneously, not sequentially, not linearly, not logically. They occur horizontally and vertically; they network. They intersect each other more than once. That’s where their efforts and effects coalesce and converge – the Heart of the War. At all times the 4 cardinal rules are being observed simultaneously, otherwise it is to the detriment of the whole movement. You need all 4 to function properly alone and in relation to each of the other 3. They make up a whole system, and the whole system is greater than the sum of its parts. I said you have to think systems, didn’t I? Now, our view is really Clear, Coherence, Concise and Comprehensive.

‘Building up your force’  includes recruitment, assignment, reassignment, training, ‘resourcing loans from the wealthy class’ (p62), organizing armed mobile units to fight banditry  (p87), providing food, supplies, salaries (194), military discipline (p202), harnessing hydro-electric power from a waterfall for the Corps’ Radio Station (p208).

‘Checkmating the enemy’ includes keeping the offensive and sniping at the enemy at many places ‘until they are bewildered as rats’ (p95), and denying food on the enemy (p225). It does not include ‘trying to defend any area’ but includes ‘extreme mobility’ for troops (p360). Says Henry Kissinger, writing of the Vietnam War (Kalyanaraman, cited), ‘One of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla warfare: The guerrilla wins if he does not lose; the conventional army loses if it does not win.’ Checkmate!

‘Protecting the people’ includes eradicating banditry and lawlessness (p87), obtaining their cooperation (p206), allowing civil authority to govern them (p229) but in any case remembering that ‘we carry a big stick’ (p288), teaching civilians to do passive resistance (p310) and to hide evidence (p360), teaching civil officials to pretend to be poor to avoid visits by the enemy (p360), rooting out corrupt officials (p635). It also includes all military officers and men remembering that mission comes first and that ‘no war has been fought without bloodshed’ (p354) and that ‘their lives and services belong exclusively to their country’ and not their families (p379).

‘Cleaning up espionage’  includes gathering intelligence (p137), preventing further espionage by good propaganda (p302), spreading information (including disinformation), ‘convincing everyone that the (enemy is) on the losing side’ (p302), not allowing people to get drunk because that’s when their mouth is loose (p343). Treachery was the undoing of Filipino warriors like Diego Silang and Emilio Aguinaldo; the only way to prevent treachery is espionage inside and outside.

4 Cardinal Rules of Sara's War: Isn’t that beautiful?

But wait! Aren’t we forgetting something? Yes, genius, we forgot genius. We forgot management. War is a business enterprise, right? Your business is to win. No matter that guerrilla war is limited war, you have to manage it extremely well – a little mistake could mean your very own head. And I have a definition for management that I like, and it’s not from Peter Drucker, whom I admire. Marty Fletcher (pacrimcross.com) gave me the idea, when he quoted Rousseau: ‘In human society, man is the chief tool of man, and the wisest man is he who knows the use of this tool.’ With that, I have been inspired to look at management this way:

In human society, man is the chief tool of man, and the wisest man is he who knows the use of this tool for the sake of man.

Simplifying, I say: Management is the use of man for the sake of man. In other words, ultimately, management is people management. I include ‘human society’ as the necessary context, big or small. And it is necessary to point out that management is for the sake of man, not for the sake of just some people. This is even more important in war than in peace.

So, instead of only 4, now I have 5 Cardinal Rules of Sara's War:

(1) Build up your force.
(2) Checkmate the enemy.
(3) Protect the people.
(4) Clean up espionage.
(5) Carry on with genius!

With 17 words, you can prosecute a guerrilla war successfully – if you happen to have the genius of Macario ‘Mac’ Peralta Jr. Now you know what you missed in my Venn diagram: the all-encompassing, the overall management of Sara’s War. If you can’t see it, as even to me it wasn’t apparent at first, like me you don’t have the genius of a manager.

Chairman Mac was the genius behind Sara's War, don’t let anybody forget that. No wonder, in the photo, Macario Peralta Jr received the Distinguished Silver Cross medal from Lt Gen Robert Eichelberger, Commander of the 8th US Army, upon instructions of General Douglas MacArthur, in the afternoon of the very day Iloilo City was liberated, 20 March 1945 (p721), not yet the whole of Panay Island – MacArthur, who was in Leyte, couldn’t wait to say, ‘Macario Peralta Jr, that was great!’ Mac was Chairman of the Board, at the same time CEO (Chief Executive Officer). A war is a popular or people’s effort – combatants and citizens co-operating with each other. In other words, you don’t wage a war – you manage a war. In war you need a CEO, and you need a genius to execute that role.

General Douglas MacArthur said of Sara's War: ‘In both military and civil matters, it is probably the most extensive and the best example of a completely Filipino patriotic effort of all the Philippine organizations’ (p733) as Sara's War was of ‘a human drama with few parallels in military history’ (Reports, cited). Not only that, General; I see Sara's War prosecuted with Chairman Mac’s brain as this: Sara's struggles superbly superintended.

If we now go back to Blumentritt’s Blueprint for War, we will discover 2 things. One is why Che Guevara’s export of guerrilla warfare failed. Two is why the Panay guerrilla war succeeded as a war of liberation.

Che Guevara theorized that there were 3 lessons learned from the successful Cuban guerrilla war (cited by Joshua Johnson, 2006, Innovations, ucalgary.ca):

(1) Popular forces can win a war against the enemy.
(2) It is not necessary to wait until all the conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.
(3) In underdeveloped Latin America, the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.

Unfortunately for Che Guevara, popular forces, no matter how popular they are, can also lose. It is in the management of the prosecution of War (or Revolution) that counts, in the method amidst the madness. Che Guevara’s lessons are all against Blumentritt’s Blueprint for Guerrilla War (Revolution). In Sara's War, we have all things working for the good of those who believed in their cause:

(1) After 3 years, Sara’s War had an Army and a Navy to support it – from the US, no less.

(2) The metropolis (Manila) was itself at war. Sara's War occurred when the whole Philippines was at war with the Japanese Imperial army as well as other countries were at war with Japan and that kept the Japanese busy and distracted and weak.

(3) Chairman Mac saw to it that Sara's War was supported by the Civilian Government and the Civilian Population, and there was money. Later, it was supported by the US Army and so arms were not so much of a problem.

(4) Sara's War was supported visibly and materially by the United States of America.

Build up your force. Checkmate the enemy. Protect the people. Clean up espionage. Carry on with genius!

Learning from all of the above, we now can formulate a new definition:

Guerrilla warfare is managed, limited and repeated offensive actions by compact, mobile bands with the people as their allies against regular armed forces in a country.

I said in the beginning of this essay: Macario ‘Mac’ Peralta Jr theorized and, along with his warriors and the people of the island, practiced and redefined the science of guerrilla warfare and brought it to an art. For specifics, considering the 5 Cardinal Rules of Sara's War, I personally award 24 Stars out of a possible 25 to Chairman Mac’s Free Panay Guerrilla Forces:

¶¶¶¶¶ 5 Stars: Building up the force: Inspired. Chairman Mac built up his military might; along with it, he helped and allowed the build up of civilian clout. He accepted that he had authority only on the soldiers but not on the civilians. While he could have become a dictator, he learned early enough that 2 parallel forces were necessary, 1 for combat and 1 for civil order. This is High Statesmanship at a time of War.

¶¶¶¶¶ 5 Stars: Checkmating the enemy: Brilliant. Mac gave one general mission to his guerrillas: ‘You fight the enemy where it will hurt him most.’ Wreaking havoc, but not waging a war of annihilation, which means suicide.

¶¶¶¶¶ 5 Stars: Protecting the people: Superb. Authority is one thing, protection is another. Towards the end of October 1943, the intensifying brutality of the enemy against the citizens prompted Lt Col Grasparil to seek Lt Col Peralta’s permission to allow the people to live in the villages and towns, following the wish of the enemy, to stop the violence. ‘Colonel Peralta angrily turned down the request’ (p406). You don’t do what the enemy wants you to do!

¶¶¶¶ 4 Stars: Cleaning up espionage: Very good. For counter-espionage, and to minimize enemy atrocities, a puppet Government was to be established, ‘but we must insure that we plant our own men’ (p351). In every barrio, the Barrio Captain was the Leader. All strange faces, all visits to families and all new evacuees were to be reported to the Leader (p357). All, no exceptions. Not 5 Stars? Nobody’s perfect!

¶¶¶¶¶ 5 Stars: Carry on with genius! Brilliant. The way he conducted himself in relation to patriotic Panay Governor Tomas Confesor, who was many times alternately progressive and pestiferous, to say the least, was once, an exercise in fertility, in fruitfulness, and twice, an exercise in extreme caution, in counting the risks – always considering the Big Picture. War is risk management, and people’s lives are what you’re risking.

Build up your force. Checkmate the enemy. Protect the people. Clean up espionage. Carry on with genius!

And so, with his theory in mind and practice in view, if not verbalized in those 17 words, effectively from 1941 to 1945, inspired and backed up by General MacArthur, Chairman Mac and his gallant Panay warriors inadvertently redefined the science of guerrilla warfare and brought it to an art.

Gamaliel Manikan said Macario ‘Mac’ Peralta Jr was ‘one of the keenest military minds the Philippines has ever produced’ (p13). I say he was not one of them. He was a genius.